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MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal is one of five presently before us with 
origins in a class action suit filed on behalf of retired 
employees of Unisys Corporation and its predecessors, Sperry 
Corporation and Burroughs Corporation.1  These employees contend 
that Unisys violated provisions of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act ("ERISA") when it terminated its post-retirement 
medical plan effective January 1, 1993 and implemented a revised 
plan.  The former employees challenge this change in plan, 
alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and 
equitable estoppel.   
 While multiple issues are presented in the five 
appeals, our focus in this particular appeal is limited.  
Specifically, we must determine whether a sub-group of former 
employees has standing to challenge the district court's October 
26, 1994 approval of a settlement reached between Unisys and 
certain other retirees following trial.  Because we conclude that 
the appellants in this matter lack standing to challenge the 
settlement, we will affirm the order of the district court to the 
extent that the order was based upon findings with respect to 
standing.2 
                     
1
.   The four other pending appeals Nos. 94-1800; 94-1801; 
94-1875 and 94-1912 do not bear directly upon the issue presented 
here and will be treated in separate opinions.   
2
.   Our opinion is confined to the issue of standing; we 
make no determination regarding the terms of the partial 
settlement. 
  
 
  
 I. 
 Because the factual underpinnings of this case are not 
in dispute, we include here only those facts necessary to place 
our decision in context. 
 Following the filing of multiple lawsuits by retirees 
against Unisys in several states, the suits were consolidated and 
transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania where a class 
action was certified.  From some 21,000 former employees of 
Burroughs, Sperry, and Unisys, three separate classes were 
created:  Sperry retirees, Burroughs retirees, and Unisys 
retirees.  For each corporate employer, the retirees' claims were 
divided into two groups.  The first group of claims was made on 
behalf of all "regular" retirees.  A second set of claims was 
made on behalf of "early" retirees who left Unisys and its 
predecessors under various early retirement incentive programs. 
 In October, 1993, the district court granted a partial 
summary judgment in favor of Unisys on all claims brought by 
Burroughs and Unisys regular retirees and on the breach of 
fiduciary duty and equitable estoppel claims brought by Sperry 
regular retirees.  In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Medical Benefits 
ERISA Litg., 837 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Pa. 1993).    
 The remaining claims were tried to the court.  
Following the trial but before the decision was announced, Unisys 
negotiated a settlement on behalf of Sperry and Burroughs early 
retirees.  The proposed stipulation of settlement and dismissal 
included those 7,400 former employees classified as VRIPs and 
  
expressly excluded all Sperry regular retirees including those 
former employees classified as VRIFs.   
 Taking the proposed settlement into account, the 
district court further subdivided the Sperry retirees.  Retirees 
who had taken early retirement pursuant to a Voluntary Early 
Retirement Plan (VRIPs) were distinguished from those who had 
elected to retire early under the terms of a Voluntary Reduction 
in Force Plan (VRIFs).  VRIFs were classified as "regular" rather 
than "early" retirees for purposes of further litigation.  The 
district court then disposed of the remaining claims by entering 
judgment in favor of Unisys on the contract claims made by 
regular Sperry retirees and on the contract, estoppel and 
fiduciary duty claims of the Unisys VRIPs.  Judgment was entered 
on behalf of the Sperry regular retirees (including the VRIFs) 
with respect to the breach of fiduciary duty claim.  Timely 
appeals were filed. 
 Proceedings in the district court continued while the 
proposed settlement agreement was submitted for court approval.  
Following notification of all class members included in the 
settlement, the district court held a fairness hearing after 
which the court issued an order approving the agreement, stating 
that its terms were fair, reasonable, and adequate.  The 
settlement was approved despite objections raised by VRIF 
retirees, who argued that they should have been included in the 
settlement given that there was no rational basis upon which they 
could be distinguished from the other Sperry early retirees (the 
VRIPs).  In its memorandum discussing the approval of the 
  
settlement, the district court rejected the VRIF challenge, 
stating that: 
 [T]hese retirees do not have standing to 
object to the settlement before this court.  
This settlement does not pertain to them; 
rather it is a settlement of the claims of 
7400 other members of the plaintiff class.  
Unisys saw these retirees and their claims as 
distinct from the settlement class and thus 
refused to include them in settlement 
negotiations.  The fact that Unisys did so 
does not make the existing settlement unfair.  
Moreover, these plaintiffs not included in 
the settlement will continue to have their 
claims litigated as regular retirees. 
 
In re Unisys, MDL No. 969 (E.D. Pa. 1994) at p.10. 
 The Sperry VRIF retirees ask that we vacate the 
settlement approved by the district court.  They attack the 
settlement on a number of grounds, arguing that:  (1) the 
settlement is invalid because it discriminates against members of 
the Sperry class by providing benefits to some members of the 
class (the VRIPs) while denying benefits to other members of the 
class (the VRIFs); (2) there is no rational basis for 
surrendering the rights of non-settling (VRIF) members of the 
class; (3) the plaintiffs' attorney had conflicts of interest; 
and (4) the non-settling members of the class (the VRIFs) were 
not adequately represented. 
 Because we conclude that the Sperry VRIF retirees lack 
standing to challenge the validity of the partial settlement 
between Unisys and the Sperry and Burroughs VRIP retirees, we 
need not reach the merits of the VRIF claims. 
 
  
 II. 
 Standing is an "essentially legal question" and our 
review is plenary.  In re School Asbestos Litigation, 921 F.2d 
1330, 1332 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991). 
 Our caselaw is clear that the appellants bear the 
burden of establishing standing and that, in order to meet this 
burden, a non-settling party to a settlement agreement must do 
more than claim an interest in the lawsuit; the non-settling 
party "must show some cognizable prejudice to a legal 
relationship between it and the settling parties."  Id.  See also 
In re Fine Paper Litig. State of Wash., 632 F.2d 1081, 1087 (3d 
Cir. 1980) (non-party to a settlement cannot object to settlement 
terms not affecting non-party's rights); Utility Contractor's 
Ass'n of New Jersey v. Toops, 507 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1975) 
(non-party lacks standing to object to partial settlement absent 
showing of interference with legal relationship between non-party 
and those settling). 
 The VRIF retirees in this matter have failed to meet 
their burden with respect to standing in that the partial 
settlement reached between Unisys and Sperry and Burroughs VRIP 
retirees does not affect the VRIFs' separate claims against 
Unisys.  The claims of breach of contract, equitable estoppel and 
breach of fiduciary duty were pursued diligently at each stage of 
the proceedings in the district court and continue to be pressed 
in the related appeals.  While we well understand that the Sperry 
VRIF retirees would prefer to have been included in the 
settlement reached, their exclusion, without more, does not 
  
constitute legal prejudice.  "[C]ourts have repeatedly held that 
a settlement which does not prevent the later assertion of a non-
settling party's claims . . . does not cause plain legal 
prejudice to the non-settling party."  Agretti v. ANR, Freight 
Sys., Inc., 982 F.2d 242, 247 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 The order of the district court approving the partial 
settlement places no limits whatever on the rights of the Sperry 
VRIF retirees.  In fact, the very essence of these retirees' 
challenge to the settlement is that their rights were not 
affected.  The position of the VRIFs may be understandable.  
Nonetheless, it is not legally cognizable. 
 
 III. 
 We will affirm the order of the district court to the 
extent that it is based on the finding that Sperry VRIF retirees 
lack standing to challenge the settlement. 
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 JUDGMENT 
 
 This cause came to be considered on the record from the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania and was argued on May 4, 1995.   
 On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and 
adjudged by this court that the judgment of the district court 
entered on Oc 
